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Chapter 3: A Theory of Truces
Chapter one established that our leading theory of peace is Kantian and that our
political discourse about war’s end is heavily influenced by that theory. Kant’s insistence
that war must be abolished as a social phenomenon, that peace agreements should be
comprehensive and resolve all outstanding differences, his confidence that war will,
eventually, recede as the realm of democracy expands, his faith in the possibility of
lawful international cooperation and the pacific influence of commerce, have, to a large
degree, come to define our contemporary understanding of peace. Whenever policy
makers reject interim agreements between belligerents as “mere truces,” when they urge
rivals to focus on “conflict resolution” rather than “conflict management,” they take their
bearings from a tradition of thinking inaugurated by Kant. We have also surveyed, in
chapter 2, some of the most important criticisms of Kant’s cosmopolitan view of peace –
from skeptics who questioned the very possibility of moral standards in international
relations to those, like Fichte and, much later, Habermas, who argued that Kant’s theory
of peace made too many concessions to the realities of the political world. We concluded
that while Kant’s account, generously interpreted, can deflect many of these criticisms,
four of them raised serious concerns.
This chapter begins by recapping the most serious challenges facing Kant’s idea
of peace. It proceeds to argue that these challenges suggest the need for a theory of truces
and ceasefires. Most of the chapter is dedicated to articulating that theory. It provides a
taxonomy of truces and ceasefires, characterizes the philosophical and political
commitments involved in truce making, explains why the idea of truce is not susceptible
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to the main criticisms of Kant’s theory of peace, defends the idea of truces from Kant’s
charge of realpolitik, articulates positive arguments for adding the idea of truces to our
philosophical and political repertoire and considers the normative conditions under which
it is most appropriate to make truces.

1. Challenges for Kant’s theory of peace
Cosmopolitan peace and asymmetrical warfare
Many conflicts since the end of World War II have been of the asymmetrical
variety: they involve a well-trained conventional army on the one hand, and an
organization (or set of organizations), using guerilla tactics on the other. 1 Since guerillas
are notoriously difficult to defeat, and since any achievement in fighting them turns on
gaining and then keeping the support of the population within which guerillas find refuge,
these conflicts are often managed rather than decisively won.
Consider the following quote from David Galula’s classic Counterinsurgency
Warfare: Theory and Practice: “A victory [in counterinsurgency warfare] is not the
destruction in a given area of the insurgent’s forces and his political organization. If one
is destroyed, it will be locally re-created by the other; if both are destroyed, they will both
be recreated by a new infusion of insurgents from the outside… A victory is that plus the
permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population, isolation not enforced on the
population but maintained by and with the population…” 2 Asymmetrical warfare, Galula
argues, fuses traditional fighting and social welfare efforts; it is the kind of conflict in
1

The military historian Martin Van Creveld argues that asymmetrical struggles accounts for approximately
three quarters of warfare since World War II. See Van Creveld, M. 1991. The Transformation of War. New
York, NY: Free Press. P. 20. And, on the rise of asymmetrical war more generally, Van Creveld, M.2007.
The Changing Face of War: Lessons of Combat from Marne to Iraq. New York, NY: Presidio Press
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which infantry captains double as educators, repairmen and providers of social services.
“The Soldier must…become a social worker, civil engineer, a school-teacher, a nurse, a
boy scout.” 3
When this is the face of war, the cosmopolitan ideal of perpetual peace becomes
problematic. Its emphasis on the final, comprehensive settling of all disputes appears
mismatched for conflicts that, by their very nature, are difficult to end. Moreover,
applying the cosmopolitan ideal to such conflicts may serve to prolong them.
Asymmetrical warfare often takes place in states that lack effective political institutions.
But since it is only a robust state with stable institutions that can enforce a Kantian peace,
the cosmopolitan ideal may end up recommending a long, expensive and locally
unpopular program of nation building.
Take the recent NATO mission in Afghanistan as an example. As of this writing,
a reduction of violence in that country may be militarily feasible once its government and
army control some of the major cities. But for Kant war does not end when violence is
reduced; it ends when violence is extinguished. Now extinguishing violence in
Afghanistan, if it is possible at all, would require setting up an effective government
bureaucracy, a professional army and police force which, between them, would have a
monopoly over the use of force, a system of courts that would efficiently administer the
law etc. An effort to create these institutions would likely meet with significant pushback
from the locals, which would, in turn, require prolonging and expanding NATO presence
indefinitely. The English scholar (recently turned member of Parliament) Rory Stewart
provides a useful depiction of this conundrum. Reflecting on his years of involvement in
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Ibid, 62. For a compelling account of how these dynamics played out in the recent war in Iraq see Finkel,
D. 2009. The Good Soldiers. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
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Afghanistan, Stuart argues that international aid and development efforts there have been
geared towards broadly cosmopolitan goals: instituting the rule of law, providing the
bases for good governance, creating a legitimate monopoly over the use of violence.
Ironically, the insistence on achieving these metrics served to distance aid providers from
the actual needs of Afghans on the ground, required consistently increasing troop levels
and, very often, alienated the indigenous population. “Lofty abstractions such as
‘ungoverned space’, ‘the rule of law’ and ‘the legitimate monopoly on the use of violence’
are so difficult to apply to an Afghan village, that it was almost impossible to know when
they were failing; and since it had, perhaps not yet succeeded, what after all would
success look like, the international community sent in more money, and more troops...” 4
Stewart concludes that most plans for nation building in Afghanistan were “too inherently
optimistic…too isolated from the concerns and realities of Afghan life, too caught up in
metaphysical abstractions of governance and the rule of law ever to succeed or to notice
that we were not succeeding.” 5

Cosmopolitan peace and missed opportunities
Kant’s dismissal of truces and ceasefires as machinations “befitting the casuistry
of a Jesuit” may cause us to miss chances for economizing on the costs of war. Here the
point is not so much that the cosmopolitan ideal is ill-suited for thinking about
asymmetrical conflict. It is, rather, that some wars are very difficult to end (even if they
are of the symmetrical variety). In such cases insisting on the cosmopolitan view of peace
can make us overlook valuable opportunities for partial or limited accommodations.

4
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Stewart, R. and Knaus, G. 2011. Can Intervention Work? New York, NY: Norton. P 220.
Ibid, p. 303
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Thus, for example, it may be impossible for the Indians and Pakistanis to reach a
Kantian peace in the near future. And yet they managed to conclude the Indus Waters
Treaty in 1960, which regulated water-sharing and fishing rights. That treaty has been
upheld since, in spite of repeated military conflagrations between the two countries.
Similarly, it was impossible for the Spanish Republicans and Fascists to reach a Kantian
peace after Franco’s death. The conditions were simply too tense for a mutual reckoning
about past atrocities – a reckoning required by a truly Kantian view of peace. And so both
sides agreed on a “pacto de olvido,” a pact of forgetting that kept Spain quiet, but also
kept the parties from doing justice for past abuses, for more than three decades. This
agreement, certainly a “mere truce” in Kantian terms, allowed the Spaniards to refrain
from killing each other until conditions ripened for a more honest examination of the
past. 6 To offer one more example, it may be impossible for the Israelis and the Hamas to
agree on the outlines of a final peace settlement. The two groups are far apart on the core
questions required for a comprehensive accord –mutual recognition, final borders, the
status of Palestinian refugees and so on. And yet, they may be able (and have come close
in the past) to agree on a long-term ceasefire or “hudna”. Such an agreement may prepare
the ground for a more principled relationship in the future. Or it may, at least, provide the
parties with several years of quiet. The Kantian ideal would have rejected such a partial
accommodation. We shall have much more to say about these last two examples in the
third part of the book.

6

In October 2007 the Spanish Parliament passed the “Historical Memory Law” which, among other things,
declared many of the sentences handed down by Franco’s courts as illegitimate, directed the exhumation of
mass graves in which opponents of the facist regime were buried and ordered the removal of some of the
memorials glorifying the dictatorship. For a useful review of the political significance of that law see:
Blakeley, G.2008. “Politics as usual? The Trials and Tribulations of the Law of Historical
Memory in Spain” Entelequia. Revista Interdisciplinar, 7 pp. 315–330.
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Cosmopolitan peace and democratic crusading
Kant’s claim, in Definitive Article 1 of Perpetual Peace, that democratic
governance promotes peace, may lead to the coercive spread of democracy. The
cosmopolitan ideal may, in spite of Kant’s intentions to the contrary, end up sanctioning
the imposition of liberal values in the name of the peace and prosperity they promise to
usher in. While Kant may think that democracy develops organically – each state at its
own pace - his theory generates the risk of a democratic “crusade” for peace. This is the
crux of Kenneth Waltz’s well-known claim that the cosmopolitan peace might engender
“a perpetual war for perpetual peace.” As the Kant scholar Luigi Caranti explains, in a
given conflict between democrats and non-democrats, “Kant’s first article seems to
provide both a criterion for deciding a priori who is right and who is wrong (because
democracies are naturally peaceful, then they were certainly forced to embark in this
enterprise) as well as a justification ex post facto (that is, from the point of view of
universal history) for democratic violence against non democracies: even if democratic
violence was not legitimate, at least it served the goal of advancing the final goal of
history, that is, the transformation of all states into republics, which in turn would bring
about peace.” 7
The worry here is that by tying security to a certain form of political organization,
namely democracy, the Kantian ideal may provide the grounds for an expansive view of
preventive war – a spreading of democracy by force in order to make the world safer. 8

7

Caranti, L. 2006. “Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace? Reflections on the Realist Critique of Kant's
Project.” Journal of Human Rights 5, p. 344
8
The political scientist Tony Smith argues that this commitment to the relationship between democratic
governance and international security has done much to shape American foreign policy: “The most
consistent tradition in American foreign policy . . . has been the belief that the nation’s security is best
protected by the expansion of democracy worldwide.” Smith, T.1993. America’s Mission: The United
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Kant and the “peace paradox”
Fourth, and most broadly, the cosmopolitan ideal’s wholesale rejection of war –
the insistence that war must be abolished as a social phenomenon may, paradoxically,
end up generating unnecessarily brutal wars. By setting up the annihilation of war and the
creation of a lawful world order governed by “right” or just law as political aims,
cosmopolitans end up committing themselves to fighting the “last war.” Such conflicts
have an extraordinary purchase on people’s motivations and may, as a result, end up
being especially deadly. In other words, the Kantian tendency to posit lasting and stable
peace as the only acceptable way of ending a war can make wars longer and more brutal
than they have to be. What President Wilson and others called “the war to end all wars”
has a good claim on intensity, given the promised benefit.
In a recent book about the Napoleonic Wars, American historian David Bell
labeled this dynamic the “Peace Paradox.” He reminds us that we have inherited from the
Enlightenment, and specifically from Kant, the idea that peace is our birthright, that war
and violence are irrational aberrations to be uprooted. But such an uprooting, by the very
fact that it is seen as the eradication of an abnormality, precisely because it promises to
return us to our original state of peace, gains a substantial claim on violence. Bell writes:
“A vision of war as utterly exceptional – as a final cleansing paroxysm of violence – did
not simply precede the total war of 1792-1815. It helped, decisively, to bring it about.
Leaders convinced that they were fighting “the last war” could not resist committing ever
greater resources to it, attempting to harness all their societies’ energies to a single

States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press. p. 9.
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purpose, and ultimately sacrificing lives on an industrial scale so as to defeat supposedly
demonic enemies.” 9

2. The need for a theory of truce and what it should do
In the opening paragraphs of Perpetual Peace Kant dismisses accommodations
meant to limit rather than comprehensively extinguish war. Perpetuity, he reminds us,
inheres in the very concept of peace. A truce or ceasefire is “an artifice worthy of the
casuistry of a Jesuit” - done in bad faith for the promotion of short-term interests. Such
partial agreements benefit only the political elites who broker them. Kant witnessed a
great deal of cynical truce making between the great European powers - agreements that
transferred ownership and sovereignty as if lands and their inhabitants were so many bags
of flour. Naturally, these transactions shaped his uncharitable view of non-cosmopolitan
arrangements. 10 But Kant is too harsh with truce makers. He assumes a dichotomy
between a cosmopolitan peace and the most extreme form of political realism. Either we
aim for a comprehensive, principled settlement that promises to resolve all outstanding
questions and brings the fighting parties under a relationship governed by just law, or we
acquiesce in a view of politics championed by Thrasymachus and Machiavelli.
Contemporary Kantians state the case less starkly, but their thrust is similar. As
philosopher Pauline Kleingeld puts it at the end of an important essay on Kant’s theory of
peace: “for those who do not just want to say that in the international arena might makes
right, Kant’s theory of peace represents a classical theoretical framework for developing
9

Bell, D. 2007. The First Total War: Napoleon’s Europe and the Birth of Warfare as we Know It. Boston,
MA: Houghton Mifflin. p. 316.
10
Recall that Perpetual Peace was written in response to the 1795 treaty of Basel between Prussia and
France which ceded Prussian territory to France in return for French acquiescence to Prussian territorial
machinations in Poland. See chapter 1, part 2.
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a set of normative ideals concerning international relations and the human rights of
individuals.” 11
The difficulties with the Kantian conception of peace outlined above suggest the
need for a more tentative, modest way of theorizing war’s end; they indicate that it is
worth paying attention to some of the middle ground left out of Kant’s dichotomy. In a
word, they prompt us to engage in the “casuistry of a Jesuit” and to offer a philosophical
account of truces: a non-cosmopolitan theory concerned with the reduction and limitation
(rather than the elimination) of war. Influenced by Kant, our political imagination is
committed to a binary distinction between war and peace. Since truces are neither, we
don't pay them serious attention. As the brief but representative excerpts in the first
chapter suggest, when we do think about truces we consider them as “mere truces”:
stepping stones in the transition beyond themselves, to something better and more
durable - a permanent peace. Truces are acceptable for a while, but then they must be left
behind. Staying in one for too long signifies failure. When we do find ourselves in a longterm truce we tend to obscure that reality by employing the terminology of war and peace
all the same. The US and the Soviet Union had a “Cold War” for more than forty years
although they never fought directly. The Americans and the Russians were not at war.
And they were not at peace. Why don’t we have a clear way of thinking and talking about
that in-between state?
It is time to take truces much more seriously. By dismissing them and continuing
to focus on the war-peace dichotomy we are denying ourselves a useful descriptive tool
that could help us make sense of the way many conflicts actually subside. More
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significantly, by insisting that the only acceptable way to end a war is with a lasting,
stable peace, we risk fighting longer and harder than we have to, and missing
opportunities to economize on the costs of war.
A useful theory of truce would begin by providing a taxonomy of arrangements
mitigating war that fall short of cosmopolitan peace. The theory would then describe the
philosophical and practical commitments involved in the willingness to engage in trucemaking. We shall call these commitments “Truce Thinking.” The theory would have to
be resistant to the criticisms, articulated earlier, of Kant’s idea of peace. But such
immunity would not be enough to recommend it. A theory of truce would have to be
supported by positive arguments that establish why the idea of truce is specifically useful.
Such a theory would also have to be resistant to Kant’s critique that truce making
amounts to realpolitik. Finally, the theory would have to be normative as well as
descriptive. Normatively, it would spell out at least some of the conditions under which it
is especially appropriate to engage in truces. Descriptively, it would help to make sense
of real cases where Truce Thinking was preferred to cosmopolitan arrangements. More
controversially, it would be helpful in making counter factual historical judgments about
cases where cosmopolitan thinking was employed erroneously and Truce Thinking could
have been more helpful. In the remainder of this chapter I take up all but the last of these
tasks. I will say a few words about the descriptive virtues of the theory here. But a
detailed defense of its descriptive force will be provided in part III of the book.
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3. A taxonomy of truces
We will use the term “truce” to cover a variety of arrangements that halt war,
prevent it from erupting, or reduce its scope - all without bringing about lasting peace.
These arrangements fall under the headings of armistices, ceasefires, agreements to
limit (rather than stop) belligerence and avoidance. Let us clarify these in turn.
In the last century, the term armistice has come to signify a treaty ending
hostilities. Famous armistices include the series of agreements signed in 1949 between
Israel and its enemies in the 1948 Middle East war (Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria),
and the 1953 Panmunjom Agreement that concluded the Korean War. Of these armistices,
only two matured into full-blown peace agreements (between Israel and Egypt in 1979
and between Israel and Jordan in 1994). Armistices preclude parties from exercising
violence against each other, but they do not, as a rule, create the foundation for a lasting
peace. As international law scholar Yoram Dinstein puts it “an armistice is restricted to
the demise of the negative aspect of war.” 12 While armistices can set geographic lines of
demarcation between combatants, these newly drawn borders are viewed as temporary
and usually remain closed. Unlike a formal peace agreement, an armistice almost never
contains clauses regulating trade or cultural relations, and it does not provide for the
creation of diplomatic ties. 13
Ceasefires involve the temporary cessation of hostilities between two parties and
they can be initiated by local commanders on the ground or by political actors. They are
often called for a specific duration and for specific purposes. The famous 1914
12

Dinstein, Y. 2001. War Aggression and Self Defense. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. P.
43
13
See Dinstein, Ibid., and Greenwood C. 1995. “Scope of Application of Humanitarian Law” in Fleck, D.
Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
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“Christmas Truce” along the Western front was a locally initiated ceasefire for a limited
time and for a specific purpose (it lasted up to four days and was meant to allow soldiers
to rest during the holiday and to collect the dead that lay frozen in No Man’s Land). 14
Bosnians Serb and Muslim military commanders regularly agreed on short-term
ceasefires during the Bosnian Civil War in order to collect their casualties. 15 Ceasefires
are sometimes called unilaterally. Thus, for example, the 2003 “Hudna” declared by
Hamas was a unilateral ceasefire that quelled fighting between the organization and Israel
and was meant to allow some respite for the beleaguered citizens of Gaza, as well as a
chance for the Palestinian organization to regroup after the damage Israel inflicted on it.
Agreements to limit (rather than stop) belligerence can restrict fighting to
predetermined periods, or predetermined circumstances. The 11th century Christian
doctrine of the “Truce of God” restricted fighting to four days of every week. During the
1990’s Israel, Syria and Lebanon reached an informal set of agreements that limited
fighting between Israel and Hezbollah to military targets in South Lebanon 16.
Finally, efforts of Avoidance are meant to get around belligerence altogether,
even when the conditions for a long-term, principled and friendly relationship are lacking.
This may be achieved by crafting coalitions that limit the powers of the different parties,
by agreements (formal or informal) to divide zones of political influence, or through
mutual deterrence (or by combinations of these methods). The so called “Concert of
14

For good accounts of the Christmas Truce see Weintraub, S. 2001. Silent Night. New York, NY: Free
Press and Brown, M. and Seaton, S. 1999. Christmas Truce: The Western Front December 1914. London,
U.K.: Pan Books.
15
An especially affecting account of one such truce can be found in Loyd, A. 1999. My War Gone By I
Miss it So. New York, NY: Penguin. PP. 112-115
16
A good discussion of the doctrine of the Truce of God can be found in Cowdrey, H. E. J. 1970. “ The
Peace and the Truce of God in the Eleventh Century.” Past and Present. pp. 42-67. For a useful overview
of the evolving relationship between Israel and Hezbollah see: Sobelman, D. 2003. New Rules: Israel and
Hezbollah after the Retreat from Lebanon. Tel Aviv: Yafe Center for Strategic Studies (Hebrew).
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Europe” created after the Napoleonic Wars contained France, restored the balance of
powers in the continent, and kept it quiet for almost a century. The division of Europe
into zones of influence after the Second World War, the Arms Race that ensued, and the
threat of mutually assured destruction it generated were together responsible for the
Americans and Soviets never fighting directly.

4. Truce Thinking
Belligerents sometimes make truces to enhance their ability to win wars. It is this
truism that informs Kant’s cynical view of truces. But Kant’s position is oversimplified.
There can be other motivations for making truces and, as we shall see, not all of them are
ominous. What follows is a characterization of “Truce Thinking” - the philosophical
assumptions and commitments that underpin the willingness to engage in truce making.

A focus on immediate benefits
The Jewish Satirist Alter Druyanov recounts an anecdote about a despot who
decides his dog must learn to speak. The despot reviles the Jewish community living
under him but admires their Rabbi for his wisdom and erudition. One evening the tyrant
summons the rabbi. “You are one of the smartest people around,” the tyrant begins. “I
don’t like you or your people, but I need help,” he continues. “See this dog at my feet– I
need you to teach him to talk. If you succeed I will be kind to your people. If you fail God help you all.” The Rabbi strokes his beard for a long moment. “Teach your dog to
talk… not easy…it will take a long time and a lot of money…give me five years and
three thousand Dinars and I will do it.” The tyrant agrees, but not before he repeats his
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threat. The Rabbi goes home and knocks on the door with excitement. “Bluma,” he tells
his wife, “look! I have three thousand Dinars!” “That’s wonderful!” She exclaims. “How
did this happen?” The Rabbi tells her. Bluma’s face turns grey. “What have you done?
You can’t teach a dog to speak! We are done for.” “Slow down, Bluma” The Rabbi
replies. “Five years is a long time. Maybe the dog will die, maybe the tyrant will die, or
maybe the Messiah will come. We’ll see”.
Truce Thinking emphasizes immediate benefits - temporary relief, rest, quiet over
more abstract considerations regarding the rights of the parties, mutual acknowledgment
and settling questions about distributive justice. More precisely, Truce Thinking suggests
that it is worthwhile pursuing immediate benefits even when we have no idea if the more
permanent concerns can be addressed. Like the Rabbi, the Truce Thinker wants to buy
time. During that time circumstances may change. The dog or the tyrant could die, or the
Messiah might come: new, more moderate political parties could come to power, the
balance between the global political parties supporting each of the combatants could shift,
a manmade or natural cataclysm could put local tensions into perspective. Or the very
fact of quiet and rest could generate stakes in continued quiet and rest. People could get
used to not killing each other and hesitate to return to it.
Peace Thinking is future oriented. The references to “the future of our children”
pervade most peace speeches. “We want our children and your children to never again
experience war”; 17 “for the generations to come, for a smile on the face of every child
born in our land, for all that I have taken my decision to come to you…to deliver my

17

Benjamin Netanyahu, speech at Bar Ilan University, June 14th, 2009.
English version available online: http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1092810.html
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address”; 18 “I do not believe that you want Northern Ireland to ever again be a place
where tomorrow's dreams are clouded by yesterday's nightmares”. 19 Truce Thinking, by
contrast, is oriented towards the present. It deemphasizes the future. It leaves some of the
hard work for the next generations. If the Israelis and the Palestinians can stop shooting at
each other for ten years without resolving questions about borders, the status of Jerusalem,
or the “right of return,” so be it. A lot could happen in ten years. If the Sunnis and Shiites
can recreate a vibrant commercial life in Iraq without completely resolving the
constitutional arrangement dividing power between them, so be it. Commercial life and
the fact of quiet have their own dynamic. If the Afghan government can negotiate a fiveyear ceasefire with Taliban and other insurgents that would allow for trade to resume in
most of the country’s urban areas, such a ceasefire would be worth pursuing even if it did
not settle all disagreements about power-sharing and the disarming of militias. Five years
of quiet is a long time. Some of the disputes may resolve themselves. The local
population whose support is necessary for any guerilla force to thrive may become
attached to the quiet and refuse to continue to support guerillas fighters.

Aiming low
A time-tested negotiating strategy recommends that we aim higher – ask for more
than we might actually settle for: price your home high when you put it on the market,
demand a steeper raise than you would be satisfied with, push your children to get

18

President Anwar Sadat’s speech to the Israeli Knesset, November 20th, 1977.
English version available online: http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/sadat_speech.html
19
President Bill Clinton on Northern Ireland’s Good Friday Agreement, December 13th, 2000. Available
online:
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/clinton-urges-peace-in-farewell-ulster-speech626328.html
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straight A’s so that they will bring home B+’s and so on. The strategy has a diplomatic
correlate: articulating ambitious goals as part of a process of conflict resolution in hope
that the parties will be pressured into making more progress. Aim at reconciliation and
you end up with coexistence. Aim at coexistence and you end up with the status quo.
High expectations can, indeed, motivate a negotiating partner. But they can also
paralyze her. They can signal that she is bound to disappoint and, as a result, instill a
sense of helplessness. The risk is not limited to a specific party bowing out of the
negotiation. Setting goals too high may well create a sense of cynicism about the activity
itself. Buyers may stay away from our home altogether; our children may simply give up
on their studies. The combatants may decide that “if this is what peace is about – if this is
what we have to do for it – we have no interest.”
Truce Thinking works in the reverse direction. It aims low in order to strike high.
It seeks to generate a measurable, visible reduction of war. To give combatants a “taste”
of peace, hoping that the taste will create an appetite, hoping, to use the words of the
Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish, that “the flavor of peace may be absorbed by the
soul.” 20
The Freeze movement ignited by Randall Forsberg in the 1980’s illustrates the
potential of aiming low. A two paragraph proposal to first “decide when and how to
achieve a mutual and verifiable freeze on the testing, production and future development
of nuclear warheads” and later to “to pursue…verifiable reductions” in the number of
such warheads, caught on like a brush fire in the United States, sweeping up scores of
civic and professional organizations, city councils and state legislators. Within two years

20

Taken from the poem “State of Siege”. Published in Darwish, M. 2011. Akash, M. Trans. State of Siege.
Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
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of its publication, the Freeze proposal became the most “successful American grassroots
movement of the twentieth century.” 21 It brought out millions into the streets, was
adopted by the House of Representatives and, eventually, convinced President Reagan
that his policy of preparing for, rather than trying to avoid a nuclear war with the
Russians had to be reversed. Part of the reason why the Freeze movement was so
effective lay in its modesty. The proposal was a quintessential example of Truce
Thinking –it stated an obtainable, tangible goal, which ordinary people who knew little
about international security could relate to. Rather than “banning the bomb” or ending the
state of war with the Russians, Forsberg and her followers called for freezing nuclear
weapons at their current levels. They demanded a truce in the nuclear arms race rather
than pushing for ending it all together. The effect, however, was to begin the process of
arms reduction.
Albert Camus’ 1956 call for a “civilian truce 22” between the French and the Front
de Libération Nationale (FLN) forces fighting in Algeria was based on a similar premise.
The French and Algerians could agree on very little, he knew, but he hoped that they
could at least agree to refrain from attacking civilians. “It is possible today,” he wrote,
“on a single definite point, to agree first and then to save human lives.” Such limited
agreement may open the door for future progress: “by bringing about such a slight thaw
on a single point, we may hope someday to break altogether the block of hatreds and
crazy demands in which we are all caught.” Unlike the “Freeze” initiative, Camus’

21
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“Civilian Truce” proposal failed miserably. Given the asymmetrical nature of the conflict
in Algeria, his specific version of “thawing” was ill chosen. The FLN was under-funded
and under-equipped and had little choice but to resort to guerilla tactics that, inevitably,
involved harm to civilians. Accepting Camus’ proposal would have, practically speaking,
meant giving up their struggle all together. And yet, the idea of “thawing”, as Camus laid
it out, was crucial. When a comprehensive agreement is out of reach, parties can be well
served by locating a modest, narrow area of agreement and attempting to make progress
on that limited front. Such an agreement serves to improve their situation in that context,
to create a channel of communication that may be used for further acts of “thawing” and,
in addition, demonstrates to the parties involved that they are capable of constructive
interaction.
The legal scholar Gabriella Blum has made a similar claim in her recent book
Islands of Agreement. Blum argues that practitioners and scholars concerned with
international conflict focus on questions of conflict resolution and tend to ignore
opportunities for limited but significant localized cooperation: “most conflictual
situations, even those of armed conflict, may be found to include some areas that both
parties have in common and that can serve as a basis for cooperation, however limited.” 23
Such agreements “carve out pieces of the conflict and attempt to sustain an equilibrium of
more limited hostile engagement, thereby mitigating destruction and preventing further
escalation.” Blum’s examples range from a 19th century arrangement between the United
States and Mexico to protect merchants in case a war should break out between the two
nations, to agreements between China and Japan to protect certain kinds of naval vessels
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during any potential conflict, to the Indus Waters Treaty between India and Pakistan
discussed earlier.

Irreconcilable enemies don’t have to fight
It is possible to avert war with those who will not make peace with us. Israel and
the Hamas are genuinely irreconcilable. The Soviets and the Americans were genuinely
irreconcilable during much of the Cold War. But the realization that others are radically,
wildly different from us, that they see the world in terms that we can never accept, that
they are, in principle, committed to our demise, does not have to lead to belligerence.
In early 1946, the American Diplomat George Kennan sat down at his desk in
Moscow to write a reply to a query sent by the State Department. His superiors wanted to
know why the Soviets refused to join the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund. Kennan’s response, which became known as the “Long Telegram,” (it was 8000
words long and opened with an apology for “burdening the telegraphic channel”) went
far beyond the question. It took up the future of the relationship between the two powers
in the broadest terms. 24 Kennan argued that the radical difference between American and
Soviet ideologies did not imply that military confrontation was inevitable. First, because
Soviet ideology itself did not dictate war: “we are going to continue for long time to find
the Russians difficult to deal with. It does not mean that they should be considered as
embarked upon a do-or-die program to overthrow our society by a given date. The theory
of the inevitability of the eventual fall of capitalism has the fortunate connotation that
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there is no hurry about it. The forces of progress can take their time in preparing the final
coup de grâce.” Second, because ideological difference alone neither starts nor sustains a
war: “[World War II] has added its tremendous toll of destruction, death and human
exhaustion. In consequence of this, we have in Russia today a population which is
physically and spiritually tired… There are limits to the physical and nervous strength of
people themselves.”
Kennan reminds us that those who are, in theory, ready for a “duel of infinite
duration” do not have to become enemies in practice. An opposing political entity can
stand on the other side of an ideological abyss and yet harbor no tangible desire to fight.
The ideology itself, simple exhaustion or a combination of both may well bode for quiet.
There is a gap, Kennan suggests, between ideological difference and military
action. And we can exploit that gap; we can buy time, perhaps even a lot of time. And
during that time, if we become the best, most principled example of ourselves, if we show
off the ways in which our own ideological and cultural commitments are more benign
than those of the competition, things may change in our favor. For Kennan,
“containment,” the term he became famous for, was mainly a cultural, diplomatic project.
Prevailing in the contest with the Russians depended largely on whether the US could
“measure up to its own best traditions and prove itself worthy of preservation as a great
nation.”
Tragically, Secretary of Defense Forrestal, who initially encouraged Kennan to
rewrite his telegram as an essay for Foreign Affairs, badly misread his protégé’s
argument. Focusing exclusively on the discussion of the unbridgeable ideological
difference between the Soviets and Americans, he concluded that the Soviets were, by
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definition, an enemy and had to be met with equal force anywhere they made military
headway. It was this militarized understanding of containment that, to a large extent,
animated the American involvements in Korea and Vietnam.
Forestal’s distortion notwithstanding, Kennan’s essay embodies an important
facet of Truce Thinking. Long term quiet and real enmity are compatible. Though it
would certainly be nice, we do not have to stop hating, fearing or disagreeing with others
in order to prevent war. The very ideologies we balk at can become the source of calm.
Marxism did not require a War of Armageddon with the West. Neither does Political
Islam. There are openings. There are cracks. The question for the Truce Thinker is not
whether we can make friends out of our enemies. It is, rather, whether we can get to
know our enemies well enough, as Kennan did, to find ways of not fighting them.

Steering clear of “Imprudent Vehemence”
In an essay titled “Of The Balance of Powers,” David Hume indicts Britain for a
degree of “imprudent vehemence” in fighting her wars with France. An excessive
commitment to the justness of her cause, to her alliances and to the very idea of spirited
fighting led Britain to fight longer and harder than she had to, without achieving
substantive gains from the prolonged engagements. 25 War, Hume seems to suggest, while
sometimes necessary, should proceed in the most economic fashion possible, and in the
name of a country’s most vital interests. Fighting to vindicate political principles or an
interpretation of political identity, while honorable, ends up bringing about unnecessary
harm. Picking up on Hume’s idea of “imprudent vehemence,” the political theorist
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Michael Doyle has suggested that such an over-zealous attachment to liberal principles
may at least partially explain the fact that, contrary to Kant’s predictions, democracies are
not especially peaceful when it comes to their dealings with non-democracies: “in
relations with powerful non-liberal states, liberal states have missed opportunities to
pursue negotiation of arms reduction and arms control when it has been in the mutual
strategic interest.” Thus, for example, “Opportunities for splitting the communist bloc
along cleavages of strategic national interest were delayed.” The Americans failed, for a
long time, “to exploit and appreciate …the Sino Soviet split,” largely because they
thought that a liberal regime should not befriend the totalitarian Chinese. Similar delays
resulted in a failure to support Tito’s independent minded version of communism in
Yugoslavia. 26 The Truce Thinker is sympathetic to Hume on this point. Prioritizing
principles or a virtuous national self-understanding may make wars longer and bloodier
than they have to be. The sentiment is summed up by the historian A. J. P. Taylor who
famously commented that “Bismark fought ‘necessary’ wars and killed thousands; the
idealists of the twentieth century fought ‘just’ wars and killed millions.” 27
The Truce Thinker would engage the Soviet Union in arms reduction talks over
the objections of a Solzhenitsyn who claimed that the Russians’ abysmal record on
human rights disqualifies them as negotiating partners. He would engage North Korea in
an effort to control its nuclear program, in spite of that nation’s appalling treatment of its
own citizens. The argument, in both cases, is that the potential benefit of arms control is
simply too great to abandon in the name of liberal principles, and that standing on
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principle in such cases amounts to a form of “imprudent vehemence.” 28

Preparations for Future Fighting

Finally, some truce makers hope that by pausing or reducing the rigors of war,
they will improve their position in future fighting; combatants may rest, work on
fortifications, improve the quality of armaments, replenish ammunition, repair equipment
and so on. It is, of course, this kind of motivation that is at the root of Kant’s suspicion of
truces. The Tamil Tigers, for example, signed up to a 2002 truce with the Sri Lankan
army only in order to buy time and rearm. A certain Colonel Caruna who broke with the
Tigers told London’s Guardian that the guerrillas' leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran,
instructed him to “drag these talks out for about five years. Somehow let the time pass by.”
In the meantime, the leader added, “I will purchase arms and we will be ready for the
next stage of fighting.” 29 Many Britons were suspicious when the Provisional IRA
offered a Christmas Truce in December of 1972. “What is this magnanimous truce they
have ordered?” asked the Glasgow Times in a December 21st editorial. “Is it an
opportunity to regroup and rearm? Is it an opportunity to lull the British people into a
false sense of security?” 30 Israel is concerned that Hezbollah has been using a United
Nations brokered 2006 ceasefire to rearm and improve its weapons systems for a future
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round of fighting. A Hezbollah commander admitted as much in an interview with the
Observer: “Sure, we are rearming, we have even said that we have far more rockets and
missiles than we did in 2006.” 31

Let us take stock of how we have characterized Truce Thinking. Contrary to the
Kantian assertion that war must be seen as an anomaly to be eradicated, the Truce
Thinker recognizes that there are cases in which it must be understood as a chronic
condition to be managed. This is especially true in asymmetrical conflicts but not only in
these; the list of intractable symmetrical conflicts is considerable as well (India and
Pakistan, North and South Korea, Israel and Syria to name a few). In such cases, it is
useful to turn away from the ideal of conflict resolution - informed, indeed inaugurated
by the Kantian rejection of war itself - and focus on minimizing the costs of fighting
instead. The optimism about the passage of time expressed in Druyanov’s anecdote, the
focus on thawing evident in Camus’s proposal, the realization that ideological enmity
does not have to result in actual fighting and Hume’s skepticism about fighting in the
name of transcendent rather than tangible interests, all converge into a focus on managing,
containing, partially avoiding and postponing conflict rather than completely eradicating
it. All these tendencies express an acceptance of war’s reality and even its occasional
necessity, on the one hand, and an insistence that its costs can be controlled on the other.
Truce Thinking, then, amounts to a non-transcendental theory of conflict reduction.
Western political thought about war’s end has neglected, marginalized or completely
rejected this way of thinking. In fact, as we have seen, it has collapsed Truce Thinking
into the most crass form of political realism and has proceeded to repudiate it on those
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grounds.

The thrust of Truce Thinking as presented here is pragmatic. It is not meant to
“unseat” Kant’s ideal but to add to our repertoire for thinking about winding down wars.
As we have noted in the first chapter, the legacy of Kant’s theory of peace is immense:
the United Nations, the permanent International Criminal Court, the Ad Hoc International
Criminal Tribunals from Nuremberg to Yugoslavia, the gradual spread, after the Second
World War, of the culture of universal human rights, our tradition (spotty as it is) of
humanitarian intervention and genocide prevention, the European Union - to name but a
few developments - can be traced directly to Kant’s cosmopolitan ideal. The trouble is
not with the cosmopolitan ideal of perpetual peace but with the insistence on applying it
rigidly to all conflicts. As I have argued in the previous chapter and reiterated here, the
ideal offers problematic guidance in a specific set of cases. If, for example, the Scholar
Martin van Creveld is right to argue that international conflict has moved into the nooks
and crannies of the international system, and is now largely a matter of states fighting
diffuse, non- state organizations, it is not clear that the idea of perpetual peace, premised
as it is on the ability of nation states to exert centralized control over the use of violence,
remains a promising way of thinking about winding down conflicts. Indeed, as I have
argued here and will explore in greater detail in part III, Kant’s ideal has, occasionally,
led policy makers to insist on dangerous, ineffective ideas for ending war while rejecting
useful proposals for reducing its harms.
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5. Truce Thinking and Realpolitik
Recall Kant’s charge that truces are exercises in political cynicism. As far as Kant
is concerned, the Truce Thinker practices a Machiavellian separation between ethics and
statecraft – a form of realpolitik that scholars of international relations sometimes call
“radical” or “extreme” realism.” 32 For the radical realist the unsentimental, unapologetic
pursuit of political self-interest is the only way to ensure a state’s survival. “Because
there is such a distance between how one lives and how one should live,” Machiavelli
writes in the infamous central chapter of the Prince, “he who lets go that which is done
for that which ought to be done learns his ruin rather than his preservation… 33” The
same disdain for normative considerations is displayed by the Athenians in Thucydides’
Melian Dialogue. Thucydides imagines a conversation between the envoys of Athens and
the representatives of the tiny Island state of Melos, which the Athenians were about to
conquer. The Melians insist that they have done nothing wrong and should, by rights, be
left alone. The Athenian generals scoff at this. Justice, they remind the Melians, comes
into play only between equals. But “when one side is stronger, it gets as much as it can,
and the weak must accept that.” 34
We should now be in a position to at least partially reject Kant’s accusation. Truce
Thinking does not segregate ethics and international relations. It is, in fact, committed to
a straight forward moral principle: economizing on the costs of war. Of the five
dispositions definitive of Truce Thinking (optimism about the passage of time, aiming
32
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low, ideological enemies don’t have to fight, de-emphasizing principles, preparing for
future conflict) the first three include explicitly moral commitments: putting off violence
in hope that a period of quiet will usher in further quiet; finding discrete “islands of
agreement” so as to limit belligerence, alleviate suffering and restore trust among
combatants; finding “gaps” between official ideologies and actual material and political
conditions, as Kennan suggested, so that theoretical enmity is not translated into actual
warfare. Underlying these three aspects of truce thinking, then, is the normative
dedication - not to eradicate war, not to end it once and for all, but to put it off for as long
as possible and to limit and manage its costs when it can’t be put off.
The fourth aspect of Truce Thinking– the Humean recommendation that wars not
be fought for transcendent ideals but for precisely defined national interests, certainly has
a realist orientation. While Hume insists that such a focus economizes on the harm war
does, his recommendation is not quite sufficient to protect against a slide to radical
realism. His line of thought may well justify aggressive warfare in the name of an
especially pernicious understanding of one’s self interest. Here it is perhaps useful to
elaborate on the relationship between the different aspects of Truce Thinking. I take the
de-emphasis of principle suggested by Hume to be subordinate to the first three aspects of
Truce Thinking. In other words, the Truce Thinker de-emphasizes principle when such an
orientation can be helpful in buying a significant amount of time, locating islands of
agreement, or finding gaps between opposed ideologies and actual material conditions.
To simply deemphasize principle in one’s conduct of foreign policy does leave one open
to the charge of realpolitik (more precisely such conduct constitutes the definition of
realpolitik). Thus, for example, Israel has a legitimate expectation, grounded in
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cosmopolitan principles, that a peace agreement with the Palestinians include a clause of
mutual recognition. The Truce Thinker would de-emphasize this expectation only if there
were reasons to suppose that it is getting in the way of striking an otherwise beneficial
deal. If the choice is between failing to reach a completely just and legitimate peace, and
reaching a partially satisfying, reasonably stable interim agreement that actually promotes
calm on the ground, the Truce Thinker chooses the latter.
In conclusion, any act of Truce Thinking that emphasizes the first three
commitments and subordinates the fourth to them cannot be justifiably accused of
realpolitik. An act of Truce Thinking that emphasizes the fifth aspect (making truces
simply to improve one’s position in future fighting) is susceptible to Kant’s charge. It is
worth qualifying even this last statement. The reasons for reaching a political
arrangement do not always exhaust its ultimate significance. The Magna Carta was
conceived as a purely political compromise between King John and his barons. The South
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission was a political compromise resulting from
the stalemate between the National Party and the African National Congress. And yet
both institutions came to take on moral meaning apart from the reasons they were created,
as symbols of constitutionalism and political reconciliation respectively. 35 A truce can
change political circumstances in ways quite different from those intended by its
instigators; even if initiated as an opportunity to rest and rearm, it can come to mean
different things to the people whose life it impacts than it does to those who set it in
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motion. As Burke reminds us, for better and worse, there is rarely linear causation in
politics: “that which in the first instance is prejudicial may be excellent in its remoter
operation.” But Burke’s point only takes us so far. To suggest that the most cynical
reasons for making truces can be morally justified due to unforeseen future consequences
requires a greater consequentialist commitment than I am willing to make. So let us
suffice in presenting this last point as a cautionary note: pure realpoitik is subject to
moral condemnation; making truces simply in order to rearm is subject to moral
condemnation. And yet the Truce Thinker displays a degree of epistemological modesty.
Bad indentions do not necessarily result in bad political conditions.
It is, of course, a separate question altogether whether Truce Thinking is related to
more moderate understandings of political realism. The so-called “classical realists,” for
example, are not as adamant about separating ethics and international politics as their
radical counterparts. In his 1948 Politics Among Nations, Hans Morgenthau argued that,
when applied to international relations, moral principles should be tempered by a sense of
prudence: “Universal moral principles…cannot be applied to the actions of states in their
abstract universal formulation, but …they must be filtered through the concrete
circumstances of time and place…there can be no political morality without prudence;
that is, without consideration of the political consequences of seemingly moral action…
A man who was nothing but ‘political man’ would be a beast, for he would be completely
lacking in moral restraints. A man who was nothing but ‘moral man’ would be a fool, for
he would be completely lacking in prudence.” 36 Whether or not Truce Thinking is
consistent with classical realism àla Morgenthau can be left undecided for the moment. It
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is not Morgenthau’s view of international politics that Kant attacks, but, rather,
Machiavelli’s insistence that the purely “political man” is not a “beast” but rather the
only true prince. Kant is right to reject the Machiavellian view of winding down wars. So
far, I hope to have established that Truce Thinking, as it is described here, cannot be
reduced to it.

6. Truce Thinking and the weaknesses of Perpetual Peace
Truce thinking is not susceptible to the critiques of cosmopolitan peace
enumerated earlier. As we have seen, its first three facets (optimism about the passage of
time, aiming low and the realization that ideological rivals need not fight) stress conflict
management rather than resolution. Consequently the theory is especially helpful for
thinking about asymmetrical warfare, counter insurgency campaigns and other forms of
war that are difficult to comprehensively end.
For similar reasons, Truce Thinking is helpful in seizing opportunities for limited,
localized agreements (opportunities that the cosmopolitan approach, with its dismissal of
partial arrangements, is likely to let pass). The Truce Thinker, to use the language we
have borrowed from Camus, sees such localized agreements as possibilities for “thawing”,
opportunities that carry a triple benefit: a chance to alleviate specific suffering while, at
the same time, creating channels for future communication and demonstrating to the
combatants (and to third parties) that constructive interaction is still possible in spite of
the violence.
By de-emphasizing questions of political identity and other transcendent
considerations for going to war, the Truce Thinker is more resistant to the risk, articulated
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by Kenneth Waltz, of engaging in a “democratic crusade” in order to make the world
more peaceful. She is also more willing to engage non-democrats and even antidemocrats if the stakes are sufficiently high. While this may raise concerns about
appeasement (an objection we shall address in the last part of the book), it also implies
that the Truce Thinker will neither fight primarily in the name of an idea nor refuse to
negotiate simply because her interlocutor does not share her conception of the good.

7. Positive arguments in support of Truce Thinking
Truces in Political Islam
From Palestine to Afghanistan to Iraq western powers have spent a good deal of
the last two decades fighting (primarily asymmetrical engagements) with Muslims. An
important advantage of introducing truces into our political repertoire is that Islamic
Jurisprudence devotes a good deal of attention to them. The first truce in the Islamic
tradition can be traced back to the Treaty of Hudaybiyah signed in 628 AD between
Mohammad and the people of the tribe of Quraysh who controlled the city of Mecca.
Mohammad and his followers wanted to perform a pilgrimage to Mecca but the local
inhabitants did not welcome them. In order to avert a bloody confrontation, the parties
reached a 10-year ceasefire regulating future pilgrimages. This agreement is the source of
legitimacy of truces in Islam. 37
An Islamic truce or “hudna” consists in the suspension of the duty of Jihad against
non-believers. It is permissible for Muslims to enter into such an agreement under a
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variety of circumstances – ranging from the perceived military weakness of the Muslim
army through the remoteness of the battlefield to the scarcity of resources necessary for
fighting. 38
Muslim thinkers allow for a wide range of hudnas – some lasting only a few days,
intended primarily for rest and rearmament, others enduring six or, as in the case of
Hudaybiyah, ten years. Furthermore, most Suni scholars accept the idea of unlimited
hudnas when it is clear that the Muslim army cannot defeat its enemy. 39
The historical record provides numerous examples of truces between Muslims and
“infidels.” Saladin and the Crusaders signed eight such agreements in the twelfth century
(4 initiated by the Crusaders, 4 prompted by Saladin). Only one of these was broken. 40
The French and their Algerian foes under the command of Abd Al-Qadir signed two
hudnas in the 1830’s, 41 and the Spanish and the Moroccans signed a hudna in 1860 that
eventually developed into a full-blown peace agreement. 42
Hudna is not the only term in Islamic jurisprudence denoting a temporary
cessation of hostilities. The related notion of tahadiya shares the identical Arabic root
h-d-n, denoting quiet or calm. While a tahadiya is usually a short, informal, often
unilateral ceasefire, hudnas are formal, binding agreements between two parties and it is
rare for them to be broken, as their stability and endurance are tied with the honor of the
signatories: “Hudna,” writes one scholar, “denotes something sacred, although it is not a
religious notion per se. Once a person has signed or shaken hands on a Hudna agreement
38

Ibid, p. 400
Ibid, p. 402
40
See Ginat, J. 2006. "Hudna: Origins of the Concept and its relevance to the Arab-Israeli Conflict" in
Podeh, E. and Kaufman, A.(eds.) Arab-Jewish Relations: From Conflict to Resolution. East Sussex, UK:
Sussex Academic Press. P. 255
41
Ibid, p. 257
42
Ibid, p. 258
39

32

for a certain period of time, he might not renew it, but he will not resume fighting before
the term of the agreement is over. There is a belief among Muslims that whoever
breaches a Hudna will be punished by the almighty: one of the breaching party’s family
members may die or contract an incurable illness. If one breaches a cease-fire that is not a
Hudna, there will be no retribution from Heaven. The annulment of other terms or
agreements, even of a peace treaty, is not as severe as the annulment of a Hudna.” 43
Muslims take hudnas seriously. They view such agreements as a way of curtailing,
sometimes even permanently ending wars. Western powers have been doing a lot of
fighting with Muslims. Shouldn’t these powers think more carefully about a method of
conflict reduction central to the political tradition of their enemies?
Consider the recent history of the Israeli Palestinian conflict. Ever since the early
1990’s moderate Israelis have been claiming that they want to reconcile with the
Palestinians –to reach a peace accord ending all mutual claims and involving mutual
recognition. The operative terms are Kantian– perpetual peace with justice and
recognition. But these terms are foreign to a good deal of Islamic jurisprudence. Instead,
Hamas, and increasingly other Palestinian factions, have claimed that they cannot
recognize Israel as a Jewish State but would, rather, sign a long-term hudna with it. The
Israelis, in turn, have taken such statements as evidence of Palestinian rejectionism. But
what is it that is being rejected? Could it be that what is being rejected is the
metaphysical baggage that comes with the idea of permanent peace and recognition rather
than the reality in which people commit to stop killing each other?
A famous commentary on the truce of Hudaybiyah by Az-Zuhri tells us that
“when the truce came and war laid down its burdens and people felt safe with one another,
43
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then they met and indulged in conversation and discussion.” 44 There is, according to this
account, no need for a formal and final peace agreement in order for the combatants to
talk (even “indulge” in talking) with each other. A reliable setting down of the burdens of
war can suffice. The emphasis is not placed on the rationality of peace, nor on the rights
of former combatants and their need to have their political identity reaffirmed, but on
what happens when we focus on the more modest goal of easing – not completely and not
forever – the rigors of battle.

Truces track practice
War does not always end with a clear-cut victory followed by a stable peace. Our
stock associations – a signing ceremony on the Louisiana, confetti raining down on the
crowds in Times Square, Churchill addressing ecstatic crowds outside Buckingham
Palace, increasingly represent the exception rather than the rule of how wars actually
wind down. This is especially true if we adhere to the Clausewitzian definition of war as
an instrument of policy (and of victory in war as the ability to impose our policy aims on
our enemies). On such an understanding, the American Civil War did not end with the
victory of the North because, within a decade, the South was able to frustrate the northern
vision of extending political rights to blacks. The first Gulf War didn’t end with an
American victory because, in spite of America’s desire for a swift and clearly determined
confrontation, the conflict ended with Saddam Hussein still in power, slaughtering the
same insurgents the Americans had encouraged to rise up against him.
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These “ragged endings” 45 have become more noticeable after World War II. As
we have seen earlier, since the late forties most military confrontations have become
asymmetrical. Such conflicts are not usually “won”. They are, rather, kept at bay,
stabilized or managed until they are brought to a bearable level or until slacking domestic
support and prohibitive costs force the stronger power to call it quits. The French retreat
from Algeria, the Israeli retreat from Southern Lebanon and the recent American
departure from Iraq all follow this pattern. In fact, the way such conflicts play out
suggests that our traditional ways of talking and thinking about armed conflict –the
distinctions we make between war and peace, victory and defeat have become unstable.
Did the Iraqi war end in December of 2011 just because the Americans left? Did the
Americans win that war? Is Iraq now at peace? Who won the 2006 conflagration between
Israel and the Hezbollah? And who is winning in Afghanistan?
Winning and the institution of peace have traditionally meant that one side can
impose its political purposes on another. But guerilla warfare upsets this Clausewitzian
view of war, often rendering it irrelevant. A party that has been defeated in conventional
warfare can switch to guerilla tactics (as did the Taliban, the Iraqis and, according to
some historians, the Southern Democrats after the American Civil War) in order to make
sure the stronger side cannot obtain their political goals militarily. 46 When this happens,
the very aims of war often change to stabilization, the reduction of killing and the
establishment of some public order. None of these achievements presuppose a permanent,
just end to conflict and all of them are closer to our definition of truce than they are to the
classical idea of peace.
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Earlier we argued that the Kantian idea of peace is not useful for thinking about
asymmetrical conflicts. It seems that the idea of peace suffers when it becomes difficult
to clearly delineate victory or pinpoint war’s end. Perhaps the very meaning of peace is
derivative or dependent on the clarity of those terms. But we are not, here, trying to refine
Kant’s definition of peace and we need not answer these questions. Our purpose, in this
section, is to provide positive arguments for taking the idea of truce seriously. And a look
at how wars actually do end, especially recently, clarifies why we should: we tend to
think that most wars end and that they are followed by a state of affairs we call peace.
But in fact, many contemporary wars don’t end at all. They morph - like the war in Iraq
(from a brief exchange in 1991, to more than a decade of sanctions and the imposition of
a no fly zone, to another brief exchange in 2003, followed by several years of counterinsurgency fighting) or Israel’s war in Lebanon (from a brief, intense confrontation with
the PLO in all of Lebanon in 1982, to a war of attrition with the PLO and later with
Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon in the mid 1980’s and 1990’s, to a series of cross border
skirmishes with Hezbollah in the first years of the new century, to another brief, intense
war against Hezbollah in 2006, back to the heightened cross-border tensions obtaining as
of this writing). They are managed, tweaked, kept at bay. This reality suggests that the
idea of truce, as we have defined it, holds a fair degree of descriptive power.
There is, then, a curious gulf between how we talk and think about war’s end and
how we actually wind wars down. Truces are common in the practice of mitigating
warfare but are almost never the subject of theoretical inquiry and are routinely dismissed
as illegitimate political goals (recall the talk of “mere truces” in chapter 1). We make
truces, some of them are quite effective in curtailing violence, but we rarely think about
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what it means to make them, what assumptions underlie the willingness to make them,
whether there are circumstances in which it is more appropriate to make truces than to
insist on peace and so on. The political philosopher Michael Sandel has argued, in
another context, that such gaps between what we do and the language available to talk
and reflect about what we do induces moral disorientation or “vertigo.” 47 What it means
to have this gap, practically speaking, is that a potentially powerful and effective way of
mitigating the results of war is not immediately available to our imagination – that our
conceptual toolkit for winding down war is not as rich as it could be. The Americans and
the Russians had a cold “war” though they didn’t fight; the Israelis and Palestinians have
a never ending “peace process”, though anything like a cosmopolitan peace is unlikely to
be its result; The Taliban, it is hoped, will eventually engage in a “peace process” in
Afghanistan though, here too, it seems like the result will look nothing like a Kantian
peace; “reconciliation” was heralded as a benchmark for leaving Iraq in 2007, though our
essentially Kantian idea of reconciliation was both foreign to the indigenous population
and quite far from any accommodation that eventually emerged. In all of these cases it
would have been more helpful to describe these relationships in terms that broke free
from the war/peace dichotomy. The main goal of this book is to provide and articulate
such terms.
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Truces can keep us safe too
We assume that peace is required to keep us safe. That’s part of its allure. We
speak of a “lasting” or “stable” peace supposing that once we have achieved it (even if at
a considerable price) we could finally begin living as private men and women focusing
on our work and families. At peace, the liberal polity finally fulfills its telos and becomes
an enabler rather than a taker of lives.
But a cursory glance at history suggests that peace is not always necessary to keep
us safe. The policy of détente between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, an exercise in
conflict management and avoidance if there ever was one, kept the two powers from
destroying the world, until conditions ripened for a more principled and ambitious
relationship. For more than thirty years, Israel has had a peace treaty with Egypt and an
armistice with Syria. It is far from clear that its northern border is more dangerous than
its southern one. There have been almost no direct confrontations over the last decades on
both fronts. While the Syrians have enabled Hezbollah to arm itself to the teeth, the
Egyptians looked away while Hamas used their territory to smuggle munitions into the
Gaza strip. There is certainly no dramatic evidence that peace with Egypt has kept Israel
much safer than its long-term truce with Syria.
To look back much further, the so called “Concert of Europe” created after the
end of the Napoleonic Wars was an attempt to enforce the agreements reached in the
Vienna Conference – primarily the preservation of the balance of power between
European powers, and the containment and reintegration of France. This was nothing like
a principled Kantian peace – the parties had little concern for mutual attitudes, forms of
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government, or international norms of conduct. And yet, the arrangement kept Europe
quiet for almost a century. 48
Examples can be multiplied but the point should be clear: formal, ambitious peace
agreements that purport to end conflict fairly and decisively often guarantee the security
of the parties who sign them. But such agreements do not represent the only alternative
for obtaining stability. In some cases the interests, capabilities and ideologies of the
parties bode well for prolonged calm even in the absence of formal peace agreements.

8. When to engage in Truce Thinking
We have argued earlier that Truce Thinking is meant to supplement rather than
supplant cosmopolitanism. It follows that a good theory of truces must provide guidelines
for when to engage in truce making. Such guidelines should be both prudential and
normative. They should, in other words, tell us about the circumstances under which
Truce Thinking is useful and about the moral conditions under which it is legitimate.
Truce Thinking is likely to be useful in cases where a comprehensive and just peace
backed up by democratic institutions is difficult to achieve: these cases include, as we
have seen, asymmetrical conflicts which are tough to end and are more often managed,
long-term intractable conflicts where a cosmopolitan approach has failed (or there is
clearly no point in trying it), cases where real ideological gaps make a comprehensive
peace improbable, and, finally, cases where immediate cosmopolitan action can reignite
conflict or diminish the chances of winding down hostilities (Spain immediately
following Franco’s death or Mozambique immediately following the conclusion of its
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civil war come to mind). Of course this amounts to arguing that Truce Thinking is
relevant when cosmopolitanism is not, and such an argument, by itself, does not take us
far enough. The important and more difficult question is figuring out when it is legitimate
to pursue partial, limited agreements. When, in other words, should the difficulty in
pursuing cosmopolitan peace prompt us to make truces instead? Without such normative
guidance truce making is indeed exposed both to the Kantian critique that blames truce
makers for cynically buying time in order to go back to war, and to the charge of
appeasement – preferring a short-lived, temporary respite from war to the upholding of
principles that serve long-term international security.
The five facets of truce thinking we have outlined are helpful in answering this
normative question. Briefly, the more an act of truce is motivated by the first three
characteristics of Truce Thinking, the more legitimate it is. In other words, if there are
reasons to think that in a given case postponing war for a period of time might generate
increased stakes in further quiet, if there are specific limited areas of agreement that can
alleviate suffering while possibly enhancing trust between the parties, and if there are
reasons to suspect that the ideological enmities between two parties do not have to
translate into war – truce thinking is a legitimate and useful surrogate for Cosmopolitan
peace making. On the other hand, an act of truce making will raise serious concerns if it
is primarily intended to improve conditions for future fighting, or if it is animated
primarily by the desire to put off war for the short term (without the expectation that such
a postponement will be long- lasting or will generate stakes in further postponement).
Now a critic may retort that these directives are not sufficiently instructive: how,
she might plausibly ask, could one know such things? How could one tell whether truce
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making is likely to generate further quiet, whether there are sufficient areas of agreement,
whether there are real gaps between state ideology and material conditions on the
ground? To rephrase this challenge in concrete historical terms, how are we, without the
benefit of hindsight, to tell the difference between a Chamberlain who, insisting on
“peace in our time,” sold Czechoslovakia down the river, appeased Hitler and
precipitated the beginning of World War II and a Kennan who, in the Long Telegram,
insisted that we should avoid war with the Soviets in spite of ideological differences, and
by promulgating this doctrine of ‘containment’ helped, decisively, to prevent a nuclear
holocaust?
The question is legitimate and, with Aristotle, we must concede that there is no
political philosophy that can comprehensively and precisely answer it. The expectation of
mathematical precision in politics is as implausible, the old master reminds us, as are
approximations in the natural sciences. We must then “be satisfied to indicate the truth
roughly and in outline.” 49 The key for predicting when aspects 1-3 of Truce Thinking are
likely to be relevant –for understanding when postponing violence could lead to further
postponements rather than an emboldening of the enemy, when there are sufficient
“islands of agreement” to merit limited arrangements, when there are enough disparities
between ideology and conditions on the ground to safely avoid war - lies in familiarity
with the particulars of a given situation. Intimate, detailed, historical and cultural
knowledge of our adversaries is the key to making these kinds of judgments. Such
knowledge was central to Kennan’s successful recommendation. Having spent many
years in Russia, having learnt the language, the literature, the culture, the structure of
local politics, having talked to countless ordinary Russians, Kennan was in a position to
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know what he needed to know. The widespread exhaustion from World War II, so
compellingly reported in the “Long Telegram”, was witnessed first hand. The familiarity
with the ideological assumption that capitalism would collapse under its own weight (and
thus need not be fought immediately) was gleamed from close and repeated reading of
Marx and Lenin. Chamberlain, on the other hand, was primarily attuned to public opinion
in Britain when he acquiesced in Hitler’s demands. So sparse was his knowledge of the
German attachment to the Sudetenland that he regularly spoke of “returning” the region
to the Germans who had never owned it in the first place. The difference, then, to put it
starkly, between a Kennan and a Chamberlain is the difference between basing one’s
decisions on the best available intelligence and basing them on wishful thinking. Truce
Thinking based on the former is not, of course, guaranteed to work. There are no
guarantees for efficacy in politics. But Truce Thinking based on the latter is both
ineffective and illegitimate.
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